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Abstract
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in symmetric multi-players
game with two strategic variables. We consider two patterns of game; the 푥-game in
which strategic variables of players are 푥’s, and the 푝-game in which strategic variables
of players are 푝’s. We will show that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in
the 푥-game, and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the 푝-game for the
players are all equivalent. However, the maximin strategy for the players are not neces-
sarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the 푥-game nor the 푝-game. But
in a special case, where the objective function of one player is the opposite of the sum of
the objective functions of other players, the maximin and the minimax strategies for the
players constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the 푥-game and the 푝-game.
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1
1 Introduction
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in symmetric multi-players game
with two strategic variables. We consider two patterns of game; the 푥-game in which strategic
variables of players are 푥’s, and the 푝-game in which strategic variables of players are 푝’s.
The maximin strategy for a player is its strategy which maximizes its objective function that
is minimized by a strategy of each rival player. The minimax strategy for a player is a strategy
of each rival player which minimizes its objective function that is maximized by its strategy.
These strategies are defined for any pair of two players. The objective functions of the players
may be or may not be their absolute profits. We will show that the maximin strategy and the
minimax strategy in the 푥-game, and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the
푝-game for the players are all equivalent. However, the maximin strategy (or the minimax
strategy) for the players are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in
the 푥-game nor the 푝-game. But in a special case, where the objective function of one player
is the opposite of the sum of the objective functions of other players, the maximin strategy
(or the minimax strategy) for the players constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the 푥-game
and the 푝-game, and in the special case the Nash equilibrium in the 푥-game and that in the 푝-
game are equivalent. This special case corresponds to relative profit maximization by firms in
symmetric oligopoly with diﬀerentiated goods in which two strategic variables are the outputs
and the prices.
In Section 5 we consider a mixed game in which some players choose 푥’s and the other play-
ers choose 푝’s as their strategic variables, and show that the maximin and minimax strategies
for each player in the mixed game are equivalent to those in the 푥-game and the 푝-game.
2 Themodel
There are 푛 players. Call each player Player 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. The strategic variables of
Player 푖 are denoted by 푥푖 and 푝푖. They are related by the following function.
푝푖 = 푓푖(푥1, 푥2,… , 푥푛), 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. (1)
They are symmetric, continuous, diﬀerentiable and invertible. We consider symmetric equi-
libria. The inverses of them are written as
푥푖 = 푥푖(푝1, 푝2,… , 푝푛), 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}.
Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to 푝푖 given 푝푗 , 푗 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푗 ≠ 푖, yields
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+
푛∑
푗=1,푗≠푖
휕푓푖
휕푥푗
푑푥푗
푑푝푖
= 1.
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+
휕푓푗
휕푥푗
푑푥푗
푑푝푖
+
푛∑
푘=1,푘≠푖,푗
휕푓푗
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
= 0, 푗 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푗 ≠ 푖.
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By symmetry of the model, since 휕푓푖
휕푥푗
= 휕푓푗
휕푥푖
and 휕푓푗
휕푥푗
= 휕푓푖
휕푥푖
at the equilibrium, they are rewritten
as
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푛 − 1)
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푗
푑푝푖
= 1.
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+
[
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 2)
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
] 푑푥푗
푑푝푖
= 0.
From them we get
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
=
푑푥푗
푑푝푗
=
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 2) 휕푓푗
휕푥푖(
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푗
휕푥푖
) [
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 1) 휕푓푗
휕푥푖
] (2)
and
푑푥푗
푑푝푖
=
푑푥푖
푑푝푗
= −
휕푓푗
휕푥푖(
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푗
휕푥푖
) [
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 1) 휕푓푗
휕푥푖
] (3)
because 푑푥푖
푑푝푗
= 푑푥푗
푑푝푖
and 푑푥푖
푑푝푖
= 푑푥푗
푑푝푗
at the equilibrium. We assume
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
≠ 0, 휕푓푗
휕푥푖
≠ 0, 휕푓푖
휕푥푖
−
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
≠ 0, 휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 1)
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
≠ 0, 휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 2)
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
≠ 0. (4)
The objective function of Player 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛} is
휋푖(푥1, 푥2,… , 푥푛).
It is continuous and diﬀerentiable. We consider two patterns of game, the 푥-game and the
푝-game. In the 푥-game strategic variables of players are 푥’s, and in the 푝-game their strategic
variables are 푝’s. We do not consider simple maximization of their objective functions. Instead
we investigate maximin strategies and minimax strategies for the players.
3 Maximin andminimax strategies
3.1 푥-game
3.1.1 Maximin strategy
We pick up two players 푖 and 푗 ≠ 푖. First consider the condition for minimization of 휋푖 withrespect to 푥푗 , given 푥푖 and 푥푘’s, 푘 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗. It is
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0. (5)
We assume that the second order condition is satisfied in each case. Depending on the value
of 푥푖 we get the value of 푥푗 which satisfies (5). Denote it by 푥푗(푥푖). Diﬀerentiating (5) with
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respect to 푥푖 given 푥푘’s 푘 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗, we have
휕2휋푖
휕푥2푖
+
휕2휋푖
휕푥푖휕푥푗
푑푥푗(푥푖)
푑푥푖
= 0.
From this
푑푥푗(푥푖)
푑푥푖
= −
휕2휋푖
휕푥2푖
휕2휋푖
휕푥푗휕푥푖
.
We assume that it is not zero. The maximin strategy for Player 푖 to Player 푗 is its strategy which
maximizes 휋푖 given 푥푗(푥푖) and 푥푘’s 푘 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗. The condition for maximizationof 휋푖 is
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
푑푥푗(푥푖)
푑푥푖
= 0.
By (5) it is reduced to
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0.
Thus, the conditions for the maximin strategy for Player 푖 to Player 푗 are
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0. (6)
(6) are the same for all pairs of 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛} and 푗 ≠ 푖.
3.1.2 Minimax strategy
Consider the condition for maximization of 휋푖 with respect to 푥푖 given 푥푗 , and 푥푘’s, 푘 ∈
{1, 2,… , 푛}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗. It is
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0. (7)
Depending on the value of 푥푗 we get the value of 푥푖 which satisfies (7). Denote it by 푥푖(푥푗).Diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to 푥푗 given 푥푘’s, 푘 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗.
휕2휋푖
휕푥2푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
+
휕2휋푖
휕푥푗휕푥푖
= 0.
From it we obtain
푑푥푖(푥푗)
푑푥푗
= −
휕2휋푖
휕푥푗휕푥푖
휕2휋푖
휕푥2푖
.
We assume that it is not zero. The minimax strategy for Player 푖 to Player 푗 is a strategy of
Player 푗 which minimizes 휋푖 given 푥푖(푥푗) and 푥푘’s ,푘 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗. The conditionfor minimization of 휋푖 is
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖(푥푗)
푑푥푗
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0.
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By (7) it is reduced to
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0.
Thus, the conditions for the minimax strategy for Player 푖 are
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0.
These conditions are the same for all pairs of 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛} and 푗 ≠ 푖, and they are the same
as conditions in (6).
3.2 푝-game
We pick up two players 푖 and 푗 ≠ 푖. The objective function of Player 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, in the
푝-game is written as follows.
휋푖(푥1(푝1, 푝2,… , 푝푛), 푥2(푝1, 푝2,… , 푝푛),… , 푥푛(푝1, 푝2,… , 푝푛)).
We can write it as
휋푖(푝1, 푝2,… , 푝푛),
because 휋푖 is a function of 푝1, 푝2,… , 푝푛. Interchanging 푥푖, 푥푗 and 푥푘 by 푝푖, 푝푗 and 푝푘 in thearguments in the previous subsection, we can show that the conditions for the maximin strategy
and the minimax strategy for Player 푖 to Player 푗 in the 푝-game are as follows.
휕휋푖
휕푝푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푝푗
= 0. (8)
The conditions in (8) are the same for all pairs of 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛} and 푗 ≠ 푖. We can rewrite
them as follows.
휕휋푖
휕푝푖
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푛 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
푑푥푗
푑푝푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푝푗
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푗
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
푑푥푗
푑푝푗
+ (푛 − 2)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푗
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푗
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
[
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푛 − 2)
푑푥푖
푑푝푗
]
= 0, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗,
because 푑푥푗
푑푝푗
= 푑푥푖
푑푝푖
, 휕휋푖
휕푥푘
= 휕휋푖
휕푥푗
and 푑푥푘
푑푝푗
= 푑푥푖
푑푝푗
at the symmetric equilibrium. By (2) and (3) and
the assumptions in (4), they are further rewritten as
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
[
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푛 − 2)
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
]
− (푛 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
휕푓푗
휕푥푖
−
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
= 0.
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Again by the assumptions in (4), we obtain
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0.
They are the same as conditions in (6). We have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the 푥-game, and the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy in the 푝-game for the players are all equivalent.
4 Special case
The results in the previous section do not imply that the maximin strategies (or the minimax
strategies) for the players are equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the 푥-game nor
the 푝-game. But in a special case the maximin strategies (or the minimax strategies) for the
players constitute theNash equilibrium both in the 푥-game and the 푝-game.
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player 푖 to Player 푗
are
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0, 푗 ≠ 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. (6)
The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the 푥-game for Players 푖 and 푗 are
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푗
휕푥푗
= 0, 푗 ≠ 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. (9)
(6) and (9) are not necessarily equivalent. The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the 푝-game
are
휕휋푖
휕푝푖
= 0,
휕휋푗
휕푝푗
= 0, 푗 ≠ 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. (10)
(8) and (10) are not necessarily equivalent. However, in a special case those conditions are all
equivalent. We assume
휋푖 = −
푛∑
푗=1,푗≠푖
휋푗 , or 휋푖 +
푛∑
푗=1,푗≠푖
휋푗 = 0. (11)
By symmetry of the game
휋푖 = −(푛 − 1)휋푗 , 푗 ≠ 푖.
Then, (9) is rewritten as
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0, 푗 ≠ 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. (12)
(12) and (6) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies for
the players in the 푥-game constitute a Nash equilibrium of the 푥-game. 휕휋푗
휕푥푗
= 0 in (9) means
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maximization of 휋푗 with respect to 푥푗 . On the other hand, 휕휋푖휕푥푗 = 0 in (12) and (6) meansminimization of 휋푖 with respect to 푥푗 .Similarly, (10) is rewritten as
휕휋푖
휕푝푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푝푗
= 0, 푗 ≠ 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}. (13)
(13) and (8) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies for
the players in the 푝-game constitute a Nash equilibrium of the 푝-game. Since the maximin
strategies and the minimax strategies in the 푥-game and those in the 푝-game are equivalent, the
Nash equilibrium of the 푥-game and that of the 푝-game are equivalent.
Summarizing the results, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the special case in which (11) is satisfied: The maximin strategies and the
minimax strategies for the players constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the 푥-game and the
푝-game.
This special case corresponds to relative profitmaximization by firms in symmetric oligopoly
with diﬀerentiated goods in which two strategic variables are the outputs and the prices1. Let
휋̄푖 be the absolute profit of Firm 푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}, and denote its relative profit by 휋푖. Then,
휋푖 = 휋̄푖 −
1
푛 − 1
푛∑
푗=1,푗≠푖
휋̄푗 , 푖 ∈ {1, 2,… , 푛}.
We have
푛∑
푖=1
휋푖 =
푛∑
푖=1
휋̄푖 −
푛∑
푖=1
휋̄푖 = 0.
By symmetry of the oligopoly
휋푖 = −(푛 − 1)휋푗 .
5 Mixed game
Suppose that the first 푚 players choose 푝’s and the remaining 푛 − 푚 players choose 푥’s as
their strategic variables. We assume 1 ≤ 푚 ≤ 푛 − 1. Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to
푝푖, 푖 = 1,… , 푚, given 푝푘, 푘 = 1,… , 푚, 푘 ≠ 푖, and 푥푗 , 푗 = 푚 + 1,… , 푛,
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕푓푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
= 1, 푘 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ≠ 푖,
휕푓푘
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
+
휕푓푘
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 2)
휕푓푘
휕푥푘′
푑푥푘′
푑푝푖
= 0, 푘 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푘′ ≠ 푖, 푘,
1About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition, please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato
(2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a),
Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997).
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At the equilibrium we assume 푑푥푘′
푑푥푖
= 푑푥푘
푑푥푖
, 휕푓푘
휕푥푘
= 휕푓푖
휕푥푖
, 휕푓푖
휕푥푘
= 휕푓푘
휕푥푘′
= 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
. Then, they are rewritten
as
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕푓푘
휕푥푖
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
= 1,
휕푓푘
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+
[
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 2)
휕푓푘
휕푥푖
]
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
= 0,
From them we get
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
=
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 2) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖(
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
) [
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
] ,
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
= −
휕푓푘
휕푥푖(
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
) [
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
] .
We assume
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
−
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
=
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖(
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
) [
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
] ≠ 0, (14)
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
=
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푘
휕푥푖(
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
− 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
) [
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
] ≠ 0. (15)
Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to 푥푗 , 푗 = 푚 + 1,… , 푛, given 푝푖, 푖 = 1,… , 푚, and 푥푙, 푙 =
푚 + 1,… , 푛, 푙 ≠ 푗,
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
+ (푚 − 1)
휕푓푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푥푗
+
휕푓푖
휕푥푗
= 0, 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ≠ 푖.
At the equilibrium we assume 푑푥푘
푑푥푗
= 푑푥푖
푑푥푗
, 휕푓푖
휕푥푘
= 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
. Then, it is rewritten as[
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕푓푘
휕푥푖
]
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
+
휕푓푖
휕푥푗
= 0,
This means
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
= −
휕푓푖
휕푥푗
휕푓푖
휕푥푖
+ (푚 − 1) 휕푓푘
휕푥푖
,
We assume 푑푥푖
푑푥푗
≠ 0.
We write the objective functions as follows.
휑푖(푝1,… , 푝푚, 푥푚+1,… , 푥푛) =휋푖(푥1(푝1,… , 푝푛),… , 푥푚(푝1,… , 푝푛), 푥푚+1,… , 푥푛),
푖 ∈ {1,… , 푛}.
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Then,
휕휑푖
휕푝푖
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
,
휕휑푖
휕푝푘
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푘
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푘
+ (푚 − 2)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘′
푑푥푘′
푑푝푘
,
휕휑푖
휕푥푗
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푥푗
,
휕휑푗
휕푥푗
=
휕휋푗
휕푥푗
+ 푚
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
,
휕휑푗
휕푥푙
=
휕휋푗
휕푥푙
+ 푚
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푙
,
휕휑푗
휕푝푖
=
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푗
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
,
where 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푘′ ≠ 푖, 푘, 푗 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}, 푙 ∈ {푚 +
1,… , 푛}, 푙 ≠ 푗. At the equilibrium 푑푥푘
푑푝푘
= 푑푥푖
푑푝푖
, 푑푥푘′
푑푝푘
= 푑푥푖
푑푝푘
= 푑푥푘
푑푝푖
, 휕휋푖
휕푥푘′
= 휕휋푖
휕푥푘
, 푑푥푖
푑푥푙
= 푑푥푖
푑푥푗
and
휕휋푗
휕푥푘
= 휕휋푗
휕푥푖
. Then, they are rewritten as
휕휑푖
휕푝푖
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
,
휕휑푖
휕푝푘
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
[
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 2)
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
]
,
휕휑푖
휕푥푗
=
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
.
휕휑푗
휕푥푗
=
휕휋푗
휕푥푗
+ 푚
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
,
휕휑푗
휕푥푙
=
휕휋푗
휕푥푙
+ 푚
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푙
,
휕휑푗
휕푝푖
=
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
[
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
]
.
By similar arguments to those in the previous sections, we obtain the conditions for the
maximin and minimax strategies for Player 푖, 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, to Player 푗 with the condition for
the maximin and minimax strategies for Player 푖 to Player 푘 as follows;
휕휑푖
휕푝푖
= 0,
휕휑푖
휕푝푘
= 0,
휕휑푖
휕푥푗
= 0, 푖, 푘 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}. (16)
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From these conditions we obtain
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
= 0, (17)
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
[
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 2)
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
]
= 0, (18)
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
+
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
+ (푚 − 1)
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
= 0. (19)
By (14) and (15), (17) and (18) imply
휕휋푖
휕푥푖
= 0,
휕휋푖
휕푥푘
= 0, 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푘 ≠ 푖. (20)
From (19) we get
휕휋푖
휕푥푗
= 0, 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}, 푗 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}. (21)
(20) and (21) are the same as the conditions in (6) for Player 푖, 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}.
The conditions for the maximin and minimax strategies for Player 푗, 푗 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}, to
Player 푖 with the condition for the maximin and minimax strategies for Player 푗 to Player 푙 are
휕휑푗
휕푥푗
= 0,
휕휑푗
휕푥푙
= 0,
휕휑푗
휕푝푖
= 0, 푗 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}, 푙 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}, 푙 ≠ 푗, 푖 ∈ {1,… , 푚}.
From them we obtain
휕휋푗
휕푥푗
+ 푚
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푗
= 0, (22)
휕휋푗
휕푥푙
+ 푚
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
푑푥푖
푑푥푙
= 0, (23)
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
[
푑푥푖
푑푝푖
+ (푚 − 1)
푑푥푘
푑푝푖
]
= 0. (24)
From (15) and (24) we get
휕휋푗
휕푥푖
= 0. (25)
Then, by (22) and (23), we obtain
휕휋푗
휕푥푗
= 0,
휕휋푗
휕푥푙
= 0. (26)
(25) and (26) are the same as the conditions in (6) for Player 푗, 푗 ∈ {푚 + 1,… , 푛}.
Therefore, the conditions for the maximin and minimax strategies in the mixed game are
equivalent to the conditions in the 푥-game.
10
6 Concluding Remark
We have analyzed maximin and minimax strategies in symmetric multi-players game with two
strategic variables. We assumed diﬀerentiability of objective functions of players. In the future
research we want to extend the arguments of this paper to a case where objective functions of
players are not assumed to be diﬀerentiable2.
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